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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/02/2011 Accident number: 595 
Accident time: 10:27 Accident Date: 09/04/2010 
Where it occurred: MF: 
1/11105/1626/5471, 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 20/05/2010 
ID original source: OPS/14/08 Name of source: UMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/02/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons 
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
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of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be 
revised as more information becomes available. 
The cover letter and Lessons Learned summary are reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan, UNMACA 
File: OPS/14/08 
To: See Distribution List 
Signed: [Name removed] Chief of Operations UNMACA, Kabul 
Ref# 104 
Date: 20th May 2010  
Subject: investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group] DT# 23 Demining 
Accident 
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned of Demining Accident, 




Complete Investigation Report to: [Demining group] 
Lessons Learned to: 
MDC, RONCO, OMAR, MCPA, DDG, ATC, JMAS, PM/WRA, HDI, DAFA, AGMA, EODT, 
ACL, CMCC, MTI, NDSS, PSS, UXB, AMACs (7). 
For Information: MACCA, Chief of Staff DMC, Director, Operations Staff 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-23 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Centre and internal investigation team by 
[Demining group] to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] the de-miner of 
[Demining group] DT-23. The accident occurred at 10:27 on 09 April 2010 at minefield 
number 1/11105/1626/[Demining group]5471, located in Qalai Saman village, Qarabagh 
district of Parwan province. 
SUMMARY: 
MF # [Demining group] 5471 is contaminated by anti-personnel PMN/MPN 2 mines recorded 
by [Demining group] on 2 Dec 2008 and then polygon surveyed by [Demining group] survey 
teams. The Russian troops and their successor government planted mines in this area to 
protect their positions from the attacks of Mujahidin. 
Total area of this task is 42,700sqm and [Demining group] has started demining clearance 
operations there on March 2010. So far they cleared 11,136sqm and found/destroyed 9 AP 
mines. Totally four accident had happened there as, three on human and one on animal in the 
past. 
On 9th April 2010 at 10:27 while [the Victim]  was working in his clearance lane, busy in 
excavation drill, the accident happened and caused severe injuries to his right hand 
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(traumatic amputation) and some minor injuries to his neck and nose. His visor was broken 
down and separated from headband. As per the investigation report, the deminer has 
breached the SOPs as dug directly down on top of the mine. It is also possible that he tried to 
work in a bit hurry to increase the progress. As he was fully dressed with PPE, therefore, 
remained save from other severe injuries. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Carelessness of the victim deminer caused the accident, as he started excavation with his 
chisel directly on the top of mine. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
However [Demining group] has taken required actions and distributed lessons learned from 
this accident investigation to all their teams. But the following points are to be considered by 
all demining teams: 
A. The de-miners should not be allowed to work in hurry to achieve the target, if it was not 
achievable with normal work. 
B. The deminers should pinpoint the signal and then start prodding and excavation as per 
procedures and the command group should strongly control them. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 779 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Short vest 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES:minor Face; minor Neck 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Hand  
COMMENT 
"severe injuries to his right hand (traumatic amputation) and some minor injuries to his neck 
and nose". No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field Control Inadequacy” because the 
Victim’s facial injuries imply that he was working with his visor raised and this error was not 
corrected. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the demining 
group’s body-armour PPE does not include a collar that interfaces with the visor and stops 
blast getting beneath the visor (despite the requirements of IMAS 10.30).  
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Typical frontal apron used by this demining group. 
While it is unlikely that the visor would have twisted and “broken down” if worn correctly, it is 
possible that the frontal body armour channeled the blast beneath the visor and caused 
unusual damage. The hand-tool “chisel” was also in breach of IMAS 10.30 and placed his 
hand too close to the blast so that a traumatic amputation occurred, so it was also 
“Inadequate equipment”. Because both the PPE and the hand-tool are “approved” by the 
UNMACCA, severe Management Control Inadequacies extend to that control group. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
also in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS which they are required to apply. The 
summary of the accident seems to accept the demining group’s internal investigation without 
question, but its presence implies that a full and comprehensive accident investigation was 
made, although not made available for others to learn from. 
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